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DEPT FOR NEA/IR AND EAP/J

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PARM](#) [PHUM](#) [ETRD](#) [JA](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE VISIT OF IRAN SUPREME COUNCIL FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARY GENERAL JALILI

REF: STATE 129240 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt per reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

11. (S) DCM met December 17 with Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae to deliver reftel demarche urging that the GOJ make clear to Iranian Supreme Council for National Security Secretary General Saeed Jalili during his December 20-24 Japan visit that Iran must comply with its UN Security Council and IAEA obligations, and that Iran should understand the international community's willingness to increase pressure if Iran does not resolve those concerns.

12. (S) DFM Sasae noted that Jalili's trip was part of the GOJ's continuing engagement with Iran. Jalili, who has not traveled to Japan previously, requested the visit. Sasae said that rather than say no, the GOJ had decided it would be more productive to speak with him, noting that since Jalili had sought the visit, the GOJ was interested in what Jalili would say -- particularly regarding Iran's uranium enrichment activities. Sasae agreed that Iran's window of opportunity to deal constructively on the nuclear issue remained open but that time was limited. He said that the GOJ would press Iran to response positively to the P5 plus 1 proposal and urge Iran to return to the negotiating table.

13. (S) Regarding the possibility of further sanctions against Iran if it continued to defy UN Security Council and IAEA demands, Sasae suggested that the GOJ would be likely to support such steps should there be agreement to do so, noting, however, that Japan would continue to deal with humanitarian issues in Iran as necessary. Sasae stressed that Japan remained committed to helping convince Iran to meet its obligations to address international concerns regarding its nuclear activities.

14. (S) Sasae also expressed interest in any information the U.S. might have regarding the previously secret facility near Qum. He opined that the activities there reflected Iran's reaction to international pressure, and its apparent determination to maintain its program. Sasae also noted that domestic Iranian politics is playing a role in the Iranian government's management of the nuclear issue, saying that Ahmadinejad and Jalili were under attack from both hard-liners as well as reformers for their efforts. He suggested that this domestic criticism was in part responsible for the regime's backsliding on the October P5 plus 1 proposal.

15. (S) Sasae was visibly sensitive regarding U.S. disapproval of Jalili's visit to a Japanese nuclear plant, quickly responding that the plant visit had been Jalili's request. MOFA Iran Chief Junichi Sumi confirmed that such a visit will take place. Regarding the question of long and medium term credits, Sumi said that the GOJ had ended long and medium term credits in 2006 and that only some short-term credits

(two years or less) had been provided since then. He asserted that the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) had ended short-term credits in 2006.

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